Reasonable Suspicion: U.S. v Rodriguez

Reasoning:

A relatively brief encounter, a routine traffic stop is more analogous to a Terry Stop than to a formal arrest. Like a Terry Stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s mission – to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop. Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are or reasonably should have been completed. From Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 668 (“in determining the reasonable duration of a stop, it is appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued the investigation.”).

Although Caballes and Johnson authorize unrelated investigations that did not lengthen the roadside detention, Caballes did caution that a traffic stop “can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a warning ticket.” Johnson further stated that the seizure remains lawful only “so long as unrelated inquires do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.” Thus, an officer may conduct unrelated checks during a lawful stop, but he may not do so in ways that prolong the stop, absent reasonable suspicion.

However, an officer may investigate exists ordinary inquires incident to a traffic stop. These include checking the driver’s license, checking for warrants, registration and proof of insurance. These inquires are related to the purpose of a traffic stop, to ensure vehicles are safe and properly operated. However, a dog sniff is used to detect criminal wrongdoing is not an ordinary incident to a traffic stop. In relying on the de minimis rule, the 8th Circuit relied on Pennsylvania v. Mimms, in which the Court reasoned the government’s legitimate interest in officer safety outweighed the additional intrusion of holding the already stopped driver roadside.

However, the government’ interest in officer safety stems from the stop itself. Safety justifies the warrant and criminal checks. Investigation into other crimes detours from the mission of safety. The dog sniff cannot be justified based on officer safety and instead relates to the government interest of general crime deterrence. The government also argued that an officer who expeditiously conducts a traffic stop, thereby keeping the overall duration of the stop reasonable compared with other traffic stops with similar circumstances, may then run a drug dog.

In essence, the government is asking to be rewarded bonus time for handling stops quickly. However, reasonableness of stop depends on what the police actually do. If an officer completes a traffic stop quickly, then that is the time reasonably required to complete the stop’s mission. A traffic stop prolonged beyond that point is unlawful. Thus, the critical question is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after issuance of the citation, but whether conducting the dog sniff adds time to the stop.

Reasoning:

Reasonable suspicion is required to effectuate a traffic stop and it exists when a reasonable, cautious officer guided by his training and experience would believe criminal activity is afoot based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts.

The totality of the circumstances must be considered in an objective light. State v. Fisher, 219 N.C. App 498, 725 S.E.2nd 40 (2012), presents factors that led an officer to believe criminal activity was afoot:

(1) An overwhelming aroma of car air freshener smell;
(2) Defendants claim of driving 5 hours to go on a shopping trip, but not purchasing anything (inconsistent responses to travel plans inquiry);
(3) Defendant’s nervousness;
(4) Defendant’s pending criminal charges for narcotic trafficking;
(5) Defendant was driving within a pack of vehicles;
(6) The car was registered to a third party and not defendant;
(7) Defendant never asked why he was stopped.

The factors in this case giving rise to the officer’s reasonable suspicion, which were discovered before defendant entered the officer’s patrol car and while the warrant checks were running include: defendant’s unusual story about travel plans (would not reveal travel destination), nervousness displayed by the defendant, use of a masking odor, the smell of marijuana from Defendant, the fact the vehicle was registered to a third party; not the defendant, and the defendant’s admission of a prior marijuana impaired driving conviction. Based on these facts in the present case, the officer had sufficient reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop beyond the scope of addressing the speeding violation before entering into this patrol vehicle with the defendant.

Reasoning:

The initial stop of the defendant was uncontested. The officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop due speeding, following too closely, and weaving over the white line. Once the stop began, the officer lawfully asked the defendant to step out of the vehicle (justified by officer safety concerns). The frisk of the defendant was also lawful as it both enhances officer safety and it only lasted eight to nine seconds (very brief frisk). Placing the defendant in the patrol did not unlawfully extend the stop.

Shortly after pulling the defendant over, the officer became aware of the defendant’s nervousness, two cell phones in the vehicle, and the fact that the rental car was in the name of a third party. While running the warrant checks through the database, the officer was free to speak with the defendant until the checks were completed. Defendant also gave inconsistent answers in regards to his travel plans and $372.00 was found on his person during the frisk.

The officer’s initial observations of defendant (nervousness, two cell phones, third party rental car, and failure to make eye contact) along with the information gathered during the warrant checks (inconsistent and contradictory statements about just moving to North Carolina) gave the officer sufficient reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop beyond its initial purpose and thus request a drug dog to the scene to search defendant’s vehicle.

Reasoning:

A reasonable, cautious officer guided by his experience and training only needs specific and articulable facts, taken with the rational inferences from the those facts, to believe criminal activity is afoot. It is not a very demanding standard. Courts look to the totality of the circumstances. The Court found the following facts, taken together, rose to sufficient reasonable suspicion to allow officer Ward to extend the traffic stop beyond its original scope:

(1) Waters and Defendant could not answer basic questions about their travel plans;
(2) Waters changed his story;
(3) No explanation was given for the expired registration;
(4) It is unusual to find a PCM on the floor of a truck (usually in the engine department of a vehicle);
(5) Defendant displayed extreme nervousness (which continued throughout the encounter);
(6) Several cell phones in the vehicle.

Taken as a whole, these facts in concert demonstrate reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Thus, the officer had reasonable suspicion to lawfully prolong the traffic stop and ask the defendant to submit to a precursory pat down.

Reasoning:

Once an officer initiates a traffic stop, he cannot extend the stop beyond the time necessary to issue the traffic citation, unless the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion of another crime. Defendant argued that there was not sufficient reasonable suspicion developed to
extend the stop before the officer issued the warning ticket and returned all of defendant’s documents. The Court of Appeals disagreed.

The officer observed many things before issuing the ticket culminating into reasonable suspicion to allow the officer to lawfully extend the stop. These six factors taken together; 1) defendant’s nervous behavior; 2) the use of a ‘black ice’ air freshener favored by drug couriers; 3) prepaid cell phone in the vehicle; 4) use of a car registered to a third party; 5) suspicious responses to questions; and 6) prior drug convictions, gave rise to reasonable suspicion. Thus, the officer was justified in extending the stop beyond the original scope of addressing the traffic violations.

Reasoning:

An officer may offend the Fourth Amendment if he unlawfully extends a traffic stop by asking a driver to step out of a vehicle, asking the a driver to sit in his patrol car (thereby creating need for a weapons frisk), or by telling a driver to close the patrol car’s front passenger door, while the officer questions defendant about matters unrelated to the traffic stop.

Based on the State v. Bullock decision, the Court concluded that Trooper Lams actions of requiring Defendant to exit his car, frisking him, and making him sit in the patrol car, while he ran record checks and questioned Defendant, did not unlawfully extend the traffic stop. However, a major distinction in this case from Bullock is that after Trooper Lam returned defendant’s paper work and issued the warning ticket, defendant remained unlawfully seized in the patrol car.

Normally, ‘an initial traffic stop concludes and the encounter becomes consensual only after an officer returns the detainees’s driver’s license and registration.’ State v. Jackson and State v. Kincaid (stating a reasonable person, under the circumstances, would have felt free to leave when the officer returned the documents to the defendant). Thus, the first seizure concluded when the officer returned the documents to defendant. However, the governing inquiry from United States v. Mendenhall, is whether under the totality of the circumstance, a reasonable person in the detainee’s position would have believed that he was not free to leave.”

In this case, a reasonable person in defendant’s position would not feel free to leave the scene. Once Trooper Lam returned his documents, defendant was seated in the patrol car. Trooper Lam continued to question the defendant. When Trooper Lam told defendant he would ask Ms. Peart for consent to search the vehicle, he told the defendant to “sit tight.”

At this point, a second officer was present, standing directly beside the passenger seat where defendant was sitting. A reasonable person would feel free to leave when the trooper told him to stay in the patrol car and another trooper was positioned outside the vehicle door. Therefore, even after defendant’s documents were returned, defendant remained seized. To detain a driver by prolonging a traffic stop beyond its original, lawful duration, an officer must reasonable, articulable suspicion that illegal activity is a foot. In this case, Trooper Lam did not have reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant after the original mission of the traffic stop was concluded (issuing the speeding ticket).

Defendant appeared nervous, Peart had a dog in her lap, dog fog food was scattered across the floorboard of the vehicle, the car contained air fresheners, trash and energy drinks. All of which constitute legal activity consistent with travel. Though suspicious at first, the rental car agreement checked out fine. This case is also distinguishable from Bullock because the defendant here did not exhibit extreme nervousness, he was actually an authorized driver on the renal agreement, multiple cell phone were not found in the vehicle. Also, defendant did not give illogical or inconsistent statements when it came to his travel plans, confirmed by his fiancee. Therefore, the lawful duration of the stop ended when Trooper Lam returned defendant’s license and documents.

Even though the stop had ended, defendant was still seized as he was told not to exit the patrol car and another officer was standing right outside his door. This was not a consensual encounter as a reasonable person in defendant’s position would not feel free to leave the scene. With defendant being seized after the traffic stop concluded, Trooper Lam needed reasonable suspicion to justify the detainment of the defendant. Based on the facts Trooper Lam did not have reasonable suspicion to justify detaining the defendant after the completion of the traffic stop and thus, the search of the defendant’s vehicle was fruit of the poisonous tree and must be suppressed.

Post Rodriguez World within the DWI Context

In many DWI arrests, the initial stopping officer will request that an officer with more experience in DWI detection to come to the scene to aid in the investigation. This could be because the initial officer has not completed the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (“NHTSA”) standardized field sobriety training. Without such training, an officer should not administer field sobriety tests on suspects and most likely should not administer an alcohol screening test as well.

Remember, since Rodriguez, an officer must have sufficient cause to extend a traffic stop beyond its original, permissible duration. Factors relevant to whether there is reasonable suspicion to extend a traffic stop in the DWI context include: an odor of alcohol, red glassy eyes, slurred speech, exhibiting one of the 24 driving cues of impairment developed by NHTSA (swerving, drifting, weaving, wide turns, etc), open container in the vehicle, the driver’s inability to follow instruction, or the driver’s difficulty in retrieving license and other documents.

The analysis will center around whether the initial stopping officer had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop to bring in a secondary officer to investigate possible impaired driving. The more experienced officer is analogous to a drug dog being called to the scene upon the stopping officer’s request. Questions to consider should include what the initial stop was for and the initial observations of the officer as he approached the vehicle. You will want to investigate the facts used by the officer to extend the stop. How much time did it take for the second officer to arrive to the scene. When did the officer start writing the citation. When did the officer conduct the warrant checks and how long did this take.

An interesting situation can arise where a secondary officer is called to the scene only to administer an alcohol screening device. Pursuant to state statute, the alcohol screening device’s numerical value cannot be used by the officer in making his arrest decision. When the only thing added to the investigation is an alcohol screening test, there is a legitimate issue of whether the stopping officer did in fact use the alcohol screening device’s numerical value in formulating his arrest decision.